This article reports on The International Center for Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE's) small-scale Facebook ad awareness campaigns ran between
discussions on the dangers emanating from violent extremist groups like ISIS.
INTRODUCTION
Market video) to drive engagement with the ICSVE-produced counternarrative videos and raise awareness about the dangers of joining or considering joining a violent extremist group like ISIS. Two ads (one for each video) were used in every region, except for Australia, where we ran only one ad. In total, these Facebook ads generated a reach of 1,048,133 with 604K video views, which are further discussed in the ensuing sections.
CAMPAIGN TYPE
Awareness campaigns have historically been initiated to raise awareness about domestic abuse, depression, alcohol abuse, gender-based violence, and HIV prevention. They are used to 1) promote a cause, 2) raise awareness or knowledge about a pressing social issue, and 3) reach and target a specific audience to deliver a message that is specific, unique, and pertinent to the target group. Awareness campaigns are especially powerful if used for early detection and intervention. In other words, they are especially powerful if the goal is to explain what can be gained by changing a specific behavior as well as what can be lost by not doing so.
In the realm of counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Facebook remains the most widely used social media platform. The campaign led to 1.7 million views and hundreds of comments related to ISIS and counter-narrative message and strategy. Moreover, a group of former extremists created "Abdullah X," an online Muslim cartoon character who was initially attracted to violent extremist rhetoric Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss3/4 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679 espoused by groups like ISIS. The awareness campaign specifically targeted young and disillusioned Muslims who might be attracted to violent extremist messages. Our concurrent brand awareness campaigns initiated in other parts of the world. We considered the potential of our target audience (U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia) to come into online contact and be influenced by terrorist groups like ISIS and the level of exposure to environments that are supportive of extremist ideologies and facilitate recruitment into terrorist organizations. Strictly speaking, in the context of the first category, the authors have documented cases of individuals from the West and Western Balkans whose radicalization was deeply augmented, and in some cases entirely supported, by their exposure to terrorist content via the internet. While the majority of Westerners are not at a high level of exposure to environments that are supportive of terrorist ideologies, there have been increasing political tensions and social divides between Muslims and non-Muslims since the emergence of ISIS. This creates hotbeds of discontent. This may also facilitate recruitment. As learned during our Breaking the ISIS Brand interviews, we also considered processes by which individuals come to embrace violence, namely from simple online search to seduction involving both online and face-to-face persuasion to engaging in violence (See diagram below). This is not to suggest, however, that the process of grooming potential recruits online should be attributed solely to ISIS. In line with selective exposure theory, individuals, which could also be applied in the case of ISIS supporters and sympathizers, are likely to seek information that is aligned with their core values and beliefs. Selective exposure in social media platforms and networks can also lead to "audience enclaves," or when individuals with deeply held convictions separate themselves from offline communities and condition the behavior of their respective community. This could also increase the likelihood for online recruitment.
Figure 1. The process by which Individuals [Often] Come to Embrace Extremist Content Online.
While terrorist groups in the past have relied on traditional mass media to spread their message and garner support, ISIS' communication strategy differed in that it made use of the internet and social media to not only spread its message and garner support, but also to proselytize its followers. In discussing the relationship between social media and violent extremism, researchers have stressed the need to look at both the role of social media in facilitating spread of propaganda, support, and sympathy for ISIS and the effectiveness of social media, meaning the use of social media by violent extremist groups, in recruiting individuals online. For instance, some authors found a direct relationship between anti-Muslim rhetoric in Europe and the support and sympathy for ISIS on Twitter. Moreover, to build support, ISIS' social media strategy focused not only on influencing its followers but also its rivals and journalists.
Research indicates that popular social media platforms and networking sites increase ISIS' reach and recruitment prospects, compared to "dark web" sites, for example, given the wide use of such platforms and the scale of extremist content consumption by users. Arguably, social media communication does play a significant role in providing support for violent extremism, though one must also consider different forms of online behaviors and offline events that can influence support for violent extremism.
Compared to our recent Facebook studies focused on reaching audiences that were already highly supportive of ISIS ideology and have progressed further in the grooming process, in this campaign consideration was given to individuals 13 and over who might be engaged with, or simply be exposed to, for the first time to extremist narratives online. This is crucial, as in the process, they may continue down the path of sustained engagement and exposure to violent narratives propagated by terrorist groups like ISIS. As ICSVE research indicates, it is on such platforms that they are likely to develop and form ideas. More importantly, it is on such platforms that they are likely to strike up relationships with terrorist recruiters who could lure them further along the terrorist pathway. Both prospects increase their susceptibility to violent ideologies and narratives, particularly in the wake of increasing tensions surrounding the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and/or Syrian/Iraqi conflicts in the West.
Lastly, although we assume that the majority among the targeted age group in this campaign do not favor extremist narratives or would succumb to such narratives, the campaign serves as an invaluable opportunity for such protected target groups to access resources that openly target terrorist groups like ISIS. They can also use these invaluable resources to protect their more vulnerable peers. Given the easy sharing and distribution mechanisms available on social media, they can also use them to use to educate and target those who might be vulnerable to such extremist narratives. Our hope was that by increasing awareness of dangers of joining ISIS and similar terrorist groups in this population, such efforts would lead to relevant discussions on the topic. We also hoped to observe changes in attitude that we would be able to measure in comments, as well as to changes in offline, real world behaviors, which are beyond our ability to measure using Facebook data alone.
We chose demographic targeting based on location, age, and gender. We Awareness metrics (reach, impressions, frequency, video views, and video retention), engagement metrics (clicks, likes, shares, and comments), and impact metrics (indicators of behavioral changes, metrics supportive of our ad, and comments) were applied as quantitative measures to analyze the data and comments were analyzed qualitatively to measure impacts of the awareness campaign.
METHODOLOGY
Awareness, engagement, and impact metrics were applied to analyze the data. The campaign evaluation was rooted in both quantitative and qualitative metrics and standards already established by industry best practices and the authors' research in conducting targeted interventions on social media platforms (See Table 1 ). Table 1 AWARENESS (QUANTITATIVE)-The total number of individuals viewing the content. This also includes demographic data on target audience • "Reach" on Facebook and "Impressions" data on social media platforms • Reach-number among the target audience who receive the impression of counternarratives on account screens.
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• Impression frequency-the number of times target audience members access or see the counternarrative within a certain time.
• Video views-the number of times our counternarratives were watched or played.
• IMPACT ANALYSIS-A measurable change in the target audience's behavior, knowledge, and attitude that could be directly linked to the online intervention. This could be measured via both qualitative and quantitative methods, namely:
• Comments
• Sustained engagements (for example, a user making more than one comment, an individual directly reaching the organization, and seeking direct treatment).
• Sustained engagement further divided into:
o Sustained constructive engagement (for example, a user commenting positively more than once to the video content, character featured in the video, or the campaign. It can be interpreted as engaging in critical thinking.
o Sustained antagonistic engagement (for example, a user commenting negatively or dismissing the content of the video the campaigners. It can be interpreted as raising doubts in the viewers' mind.
AWARENESS METRICS

Geographic Location and Demographic Data
Geographic Location
Campaigns targeted predominantly English-speaking regions. The United
States, The United Kingdom, and Canada all received two campaignsone for each video. Australia received one campaign for the Today is the Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah video. The United Kingdom received slightly more specific targeting, specifically in Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, London, and Manchester, primarily due to existing and potential spread of extremism in these areas. Cardiff was targeted in Wales for the same reasons.
Demographic Information
Across Other ads, which included that age group, only had them make up less than 2 -4 percent, so the Australia campaign was unique in its greater ability to connect with minors.
Video Views as of 03/22/2018
The ICSVE Facebook ads campaigns generated a reach of 1,048,133, with 604K video views. As we continue to experiment with these interventions
in the future, we hope to further expand our reach, hone in our internet targeting, and increase the interest of our target audience, specifically among those who may be willing to act as influencers and magnify our impact. We also hope to reach to individuals that are more vulnerable and redirect them to our newly created website to engage in further discussion forums, watch additional videos, or gain access to other CVErelated resources and materials. This could serve to further expand and strengthen the line of communication with them and lead to greater prevention and intervention efforts. We will also attempt to generate A more specific breakdown of watch time by individual ad is listed at the end of this report.
Facebook Ad Access
More people viewed our ads on an iPhone (261,313 total) than on an As one user commented, "I don't like x, but I will share x," illustrating that even those disturbed by our content found it important enough to spread.
In total there were: However, we must be careful not to attribute certain user behavior online, the 1, 663 likes in our case, for instance, as necessarily an indication of support for our campaign or videos. In other words, there might be among those who might have been motivated not by the content of our videos but rather morbid infatuation, curiosity, or many other factors.
Three of our Facebook ads generated a relevance score of 10, two generated scores of 9, and two generated relevance scores of eight, as calculated on a 1-10 scale. The higher the relevance score, the better in terms of how our audience is responding to our ad. According to Facebook, "a relevance score is calculated based on the positive and negative feedback we expect an ad to receive from its target audience. Engaging English Speaking Facebook User in an anti-ISIS Awareness Campaign is hidden, or number of times someone clicks "I don't want to see this" on our ad, represent negative indicators. Before a relevance score is generated, our ad must have been served or shown 500 times (for example, 500 impressions are received). The relevance score is especially important to better identify our target audiences and use it for our campaign optimization. That said the relevance score is used to measure relevance of a campaign and not the quality of campaign. In other words, it is generated based on interaction and interest in our campaign. Despite its limitations, it is especially useful in understanding whether our target audience is considering our campaign and whether it is engaging with it. Our high relevance scores make clear that we are garnering audience engagement.
Positive feedback and negative feedback were both reportedly " high"
(out of the options "low," " medium," or "high") for every single ad. This means many people were estimated to interact with our English-speaker targeted videos, but many people also chose not to view it. This is typical of all ICSVE ads, especially those that receive higher relevance scores of 8, 9, or 10. We will continue to aim for high relevance scores. That said,
we would continue to reevaluate such scores depending on how well our campaigns are meeting our objectives of raising awareness about the dangers of joining ISIS. Moreover, it is not necessary to have high relevance scores as long as we meet expected campaign objectives of raising awareness about the dangers of joining ISIS. The following section contains a qualitative analysis of comments and discussions generated by our ads. Across all seven campaigns, there were 1,079 comments. About half (538) of these comments came from the UK Slave Market Campaign. Ads, which targeted Canada, received the least amount of comments for both videos.
COMMENTS AND QUALITATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS
Defense of Islam and "Negative Category" -Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video, Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General
"This is not Islam. They're using the religion for their own benefit." -US, Slave Market 
Comment Trends Specific to the Today is the Female Slave Market Day in ad-Dawlah video
The Slave Market ad provoked more disagreements and more emotionally charged language (mostly anger and disgust) than the Promises ad. In keeping with the female-focused comments, there was a small trend of commenters pointing out feminisms, particularly western feminism's alleged failure to recognize or help the women who'd been enslaved by
ISIS. The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)
researchers noticed this trend last year as well when the same videos were shown to other English speakers, and some French speakers.
Examples:
"Where's the feminists fighting for these girl's equality?" -Australia, Slave Market "Why aren't all these feminists crying out about this instead of claiming sexual harassment every time a man looks in their direction" -UK, Slave Market
Additionally, many commenters were confused and upset by the fact that the defector emphasized the religion of the enslaved women. To the viewers, it appeared the defector used women's Islamic status as the determining factor in whether mass rape and enslavement was acceptable. Commenters therefore concluded this meant the defector was fine with enslaving non-Muslim women. 
"Negative Category" -Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video, Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General
"Supportive Category"-Comments in Support of the Video, Characters in the Video, or the Campaign in General
"I just love how this guy telling the story proves that they don't all believe this is the way of life "this isn't right -Australia," Slave Market
Comment Trends Specific to the Promises of Ad-Dawlah to Women Video
While the Promises ad also provoked some arguments in the comment section, most commenters agreed that the subject of the video -Laura Passoni -was in their opinions: unintelligent, laughable, and to be shown no sympathy. This was by far the greatest trend specific to this video. "Negative Category"-comments expressing dislike towards the video, characters featured in the video or the campaign in general "That's what you get for joining a terrorist organization, no sympathy whatsoever" -UK, Promises "Traitor." -Canada, Promises "Oh, come on. My boyfriend dumped me, so my next logical step is to join ISIS?" -Canada Promises "Hard to have sympathy for a moron." -Canada, Promises "What a [expletive] moron." -U.S., Promises "This woman is a lying piece of expletive! Trying to gain sympathy because she was caught out, she should receive a bullet to the head along with anyone else who returns from Syria/Iraq etc." -UK, Promises "By this video they try to justify what she has done by showing her naive but joining a brutal terrorist group by itself is a crime against humanity. If she was offered what she was promised, then she was going to continue supporting IS? No sympathy towards those beaches at all ." -UK, Promises "Why is she not in prison with [her husband]?" -Canada, Promises
There were some comments expressing sympathy or understanding.
However, while there were more sympathetic comments for Laura than for the male defector in the Slave Market video, they were still sparse.
"Supportive Category"-Comments in Support of the Video, Characters in the Video, or the Campaign in General
*In response to someone insulting the defector's intelligence:
"What part did you not understand when she said she was 
Promises
Why Do the Two Videos Receive Different Reactions?
First, each video has a different focus. In Promises of Ad-Dawlah to Women, the defector spoke primarily of her own mistreatment by ISIS.
Furthermore, her most emphasized suffering was because of being misled.
In Today is the Female Slave Market in Ad-Dawlah, the defector discussed the mistreatment of slave women by ISIS, and the emphasis was on sexual enslavement -a circumstance graver and more graphic than what was discussed in Promises.
Second, each defector's gender, ethnicity, and nationality must be taken into consideration. The defector in the Slave Market video was a Syrian (Arab) male. His ethnicity might have made it easier for the audience to view him as a representation of all Middle Eastern people and, therefore, Middle Eastern culture. Likewise, his gender (male) might have made it easier for the audience to view him as predatory or aggressive.
However, since the defector in the Promises video is a female, it might have been easier to perceive her as a "stupid" or "vulnerable" individual who was taken advantage of rather than mal-intended. Since these videos targeted the Western world (Australia included), Laura being white and
European might have also prompted some cognitive dissonance in the viewers; it would be less upsetting to think of her as an unintelligent exception to -as opposed to a representation of -the population to which the audience otherwise belongs.
Regional Comment Trends
Both ICSVE videos were called propaganda by viewers across regions, but the UK dominated this trend overall. One possible reason for this is that Below are examples of comments against Trudeau:
"Keep the pieces of expletive in their own country and send Trudeau and his bum buddies there also" -Canada, Slave Market *In response to a meme of Justin Trudeau: "By the way, he sell arms to Saudi Arabia in billions, which is given to ISIS, and used to bomb children's of Yemen, the money is brought to Canada, the act was done by your great grandfathers with the indigenous and still doing it, you all are British refugees, so shut up, and stop giving arms and ammunitions to Saudi and Israeli regimes to create such monsters" -Canada, Slave Market "And Trudo wants to give these animals a hug." -Canada, Slave Market "Hope every single one of those disgusting enslaving piles of expletive end up dying slowly and painfully and expletive Trudeau for accepting /rewarding this culture/ideology it makes me sick and filled with pity for those poor girls I can only hope some of them will taste real freedom asap." -Canada, Slave Market
Additionally, the UK and Canada both presented a trend of comments expressing concern that Islam/ISIS/refugees were plaguing their countries. This was expressed as either fear that Muslims were going to take over, or frustration that they already had. The reason this, arguably, is not so much a trend for the US is likely because President Trump is conservative in his positions on refugees and immigrants, so much so that he proposed both the travel ban and "the wall." In fact, some UK Facebook commenters even commended Trump. The reason this is not so much a trend for Australia is likely because Australia is farther away from the Middle East, and because Australia was the only region to be targeted with one video instead of two (therefore receiving only half as many opportunities for comments).
Examples: In analyzing our data, we have attempted to apply a combination of awareness, engagement, and impact analysis metrics to discern the extent to which our interventions achieved its desired effect. As indicated in the paper, many discussed the message and the messaging strategy of our counter-narratives, as well as challenged extremist narratives of violent extremist groups like ISIS. Given the amount of comments generated and the fact that there are no established "best practices" in collecting and analyzing social media generated data, we decided to group them into certain categories and illustrate directly (select few) the nature of each.
We were able to find and present evidence that our viewers have thoughtfully engaged with the content of our videos, including initiated debates on women, role of gender in Islam, and other contentious sociopolitical issues that often influence and drive violent extremism. That said, the results generated represent a short-term measurement of the impact of our videos and only allow us to utilize such data to further improve our future targeting campaigns, namely by gaining an increased understanding of user behavior on Facebook and other social media platforms.
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Note that counter-narratives, or direct counter-narratives characterize the work of our organization. They are used to directly target and discredit terrorist groups and their ideologies by using the voices of disillusioned insiders, or those who have first-hand experience and knowledge about ISIS. In our case, they are purposely not labeled as counter-narratives, so that those already engaging online with ISIS propaganda will be likely to also encounter and engage with our counter narratives and get a very different message.
To avoid turning away potential viewers in the vulnerable audiences, the videos are named with pro-ISIS or ambivalent names and illustrated with ISIS generated footage which then becomes the thumbnail for the video. U.S. military psych-ops and Google also weighed in on the issue of naming the videos and advised that the efficacy of counternarrative videos will be enhanced if they are not openly named as counternarratives, meaning they need to have titles that are "catchy" and attractive to a possible ISIS follower. Our research leading to the production of our initial videos was also fully vetted by the Google production team as well. For more on counter-narratives and messaging, please see Rachel Briggs and Sebastien Feve, "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013, available at file:///C:/Users/Me/Downloads/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf.
